Ferocious Detonations at the BP Texas City Refinery

A series of explosions took place at the BP Texas City refinery on 23 March 2005 when a distillation tower, overfilled with highly flammable liquid hydrocarbons and over-pressurized, caused a geyser-like release of highly flammable liquid and vapour from the vent stack onto the grounds of the refinery. This catastrophic process accident took 15 lives, injured 170 others, and was the worst industrial accident in United States (U.S.) since 1990.
On the recommendation of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board who investigated the Texas City incident, BP Headquarters commissioned an independent safety review panel in October 2005 to make a thorough, independent and credible assessment of corporate oversight of safety management systems at the company's five U.S. refineries and of the company's corporate safety culture.
Lead by former US Secretary of State James Baker III, the independent panel released its 374-page report on 16 Jan 2007. In its report, the panel recommended a range of safety measures, including a strong safety audit system and an independent monitor to follow BP's progress for five years. The panel made the following 10 recommendations:

1. BP's executive management must provide effective leadership on and establish appropriate goals for process safety. They must articulate a clear message on the importance of safety, and match it with policies and actions.
2. BP should create a system to identify, reduce and manage safety risk.
3. BP should create a system to ensure that staff from top management to refinery workers should possess an appropriate level of process safety knowledge and expertise.
4. BP should involve relevant stakeholders to develop a positive, trusting and open safety culture within each U.S. refinery.
5. BP should define expectations and strengthen accountability for safety performance at all levels.
6. BP should provide more effective and better coordinated process safety support for the U.S. refining line organization.
7. BP should develop and maintain an integrated set of leading and lagging safety performance indicators to improve monitoring of its safety performance.
8. BP should create a system to audit safety performance at all U.S. refineries.
9. BP's Board should engage an independent monitor to report on BP's progress in applying these recommendations for at least five calendar years. BP should report publicly on its progress and safety performance.
10. BP should use the lessons learned from the Texas City explosion and the panel's report to transform the company into an industry leader in safety management.

Click HERE to read more about details about the incident in the Baker’s Panel Report.

(From MOM circlar,OSH Alert dated 12 February 2007)